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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
quality.'IO Whether or not such a conclusion is true, it is certain that the effects
of embezzlement and larceny are identical in so far as the lawful owner of
property is concerned; in either case, he has been deprived of his property.
To avoid the confusing distinctions between guilty intent at the taking and
after-acquired guilty intent, New York in 1942 recodified into a single theft
statute all crimes of a theft nature without reference to the time of forming
the guilty intent.' 6 While New York's solution to the problem appears to be
the most simple, the decision in the instant case appears to be equally effective.
JOHN A. DOEHRn.
EQUITY - INJUNCTIONS - EQUITABLE RELIEF NOT AVAILABLE FOR VIOLATION
oF CIVIL RIGHTS STATUTE. - Plaintff, a negro woman, brought an action
against the operator of a privately owned amusement park to enjoin him from
refusing her admittance to the park because of her race. An Ohio statute pro-
vides that the proprietor of a place of amusement who denies to a citizen,
except for reasons applicable to all, the full enjoyment of the facilities shall be
subject to fine and imprisonment, or in the alternative to the payment of
damages.' The Ohio Supreme Court, two justices dissenting, held that the
remedy provided by the statute was exclusive and an additional remedy by
way of injunction was not available. Fletcher v. Coney Island, 165 Ohio St.
150, 134 N.E.2d 371 (1956).
The holding in the principal case is based on the rule that where a statute
ceates a new right the remedy provided is exclusive. The common law recog-
nizes an exception to- this rule where the remedy provided is inadequate, and
allows an injunction as an ancillary remedy unless excluded expressly or by
necessary implication. 2 Some-American jurisdictions have allowed the remedy
which would best protect the plaintiff's right irrespective of the fact that the
statute did not expressly grant such remedy. *
One writer has said that the statutory grant of a right should be considered
as distinct from the remedy provided. 4 If this were not true, the possibility
15. Van Vechtcn v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 239 N. Y. 363, 146 N.E. 432, 433.
(1925).
16. See N. Y. Consolidated Law Service, Penal Law, 1 1290 (1951).
1. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2901.35 (Baldwin 1953) "No proprietor or his employee,
keeper or manager of an inn, restaurant, eating house, barber shop, public conveyance by
air, land, or water, theater, store or other place for the sale of merchandise, or any othet
place of public accommodation or amusement, shall deny to a citizen, except for reasons
applicable alike to all citizens and regardless of color or race, the full enjoyment of the'
accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof, and no person shall aid or in-
cite the denial thereof. Whoever violates this section shall be fined not less than fifty nor
more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not less than thirty nor more than ninety
days or both, and shall pay not less than fifty nor more than five hundred dollars to the
person aggrieved thereby to he recovered in any court in the county where the violation
was committed."
Id., § 2901.36 "Either a judgment in favor of the person aggrieved, or the punishment
of the offender upon an indictment under section 2901.35 of the revised code, is a bar to
further prosecution for a violation of such section." (Italics added).
2. Cooper v. Whittingham, 49 L. J. 752 (Ch. 1880).
3. See Amos v. Prom, 117 F. Supp. 615 (N. D. Iowa 1954); Powell v. Utz, 87
F. Supp. 811 (E. D. Wash. 1949); Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, 30 Cal.2d 110,
180 P.2d 321 ,(1947); Humburd v. Crawford, 128 Iowa 743, 105 N.W. 330 (1905);
Bolden v. Grand Rapids Operating Corp., 239 Mich. 318, 214 N.W. 241 (1927); Grannon
v. Westchester Racing Assn., 16 App. Div. 8, 44 N. Y. Supp. 790 (App. Div. 1897),
rev'd on other grounds, 153 N. Y. 489, 47 N.E. 869 (1897); Everett v. Harron, 380 Pa,
123, 110 A.2d 383 (1955); Randall v. Cowlitz Amusement Inc., 194 Wash. 82, 76 P.2d
1017 (1938).
4. 1 Lewis, Sutherland on Statutory Construction, 549 (2d ed. 1904).
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would exist that if the remedy were misconstrued the right would be denied.
That is the effect of the decision in the instant case, unless it could be said
that the legislature intended to recognize only a limited right. However, a
common sense reading of the complete statute would lead one to believe that
Ohio intended to recognize the unlimited right of all citizens to be admitted
to privately owned places of public accommodation and amusement on an
equal basis.
Modern law is committed to redress injuries to personality,-- and mental
pain and suffering are often a major part of the damages awarded in tort
litigation. Public humilitation and injured feelings are the basis for the rela-
tively new tort action of intentional infliction of emotoinal distress.6 Injunc-
tive relief is available where the remedy at law is inadequate fbr the protec-
tion of personality, even though the harm done or threatened consists of noth-
ing more than injury to feelings of sensibility and honor7 The United States
Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education8 found that racial discrimina-
tion caused psychological injury and based its holding at least in part on this
factor. Other Courts have repeatedly held that equitable relief is available is
an effective and just method of guarantying the enjoyment of civil rights.!,
The last section of the Ohio Civil Rights act provides that a judgment in
favor of the person aggrieved in either a civil or a criminal action "is a bar
t, further prosecution for it violation" of the act."' Although not the basis for
the holding in the principal case, this section would seem to indicate that it
verdict for the plaintiff is a bar to any other action between the same parties
even for future violations of the act. In other words the offender would be
vaccinated by the needle of the law and thereafter become immune." This
paragraph assumed its present form at the codification of Ohio law in 1910, -'
and its constitutionality appears to be a matter of conjecture. The provision
might have been designed to preclude equitable relief on the grounds of pre-
venting multiplicity of suits.
The Ohio Supreme Court in the instant case grounded its denial of an in-
junction on the premise that the statutory remedy is exclusive because a new
right unknown to common law was created and therefore strict constnction
must be applied. However, a rule of construction is only a method to arrive
at the purpose of a statute and to reach a just result. It is submitted that
5. See Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 Harv. L. Rev. 343 (1915).
6. Prosser, Torts, 38 (2d ed., 1955); Restatement, Torts § 46 (1948 Supp.).
7. See Henley v. Rockett, 23 Ala. 172, 8 So.2d 852 (1942) (Wife granted an in-
junction restraining third party from alienating the affections of husband); Blanton v.
Blanton, 163 Ga. 361, 136 S.E. 141 (1926) (Court found a property right invo'ved :ind
restrained wife from interfering with or harrassing husband during divorce litigation);
Reed v. Carter, 268 Ky. 1, 103 S.W.2d 663 (1937) (Equity will protect plaintiff's right to
visit hr mother without molestation by third party); Hawks v. Yancey, 265 S.W. 233(Tex. Civ. App. 1924) (Injunction lies to protect women from a person who is making
statements against her and imposing himself unn her in public). For discissions of
personal rights in equity see Pound, Eauitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to
Personality, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 640 (1916); Long, Equitable Jurisdiction to Protect Per-
sonal Rights. 33 Yale L. J. 115 (1923); de Funiak, Equitable Protection of Personal and
Irdividual Rights, 36 Ky. L. J. 7 (1947). See Restatement, Torts § 937, comment a (1939).
8. 347 U. S. 483 (1954).
9. See Draper v. City of St. Louis, 92 F. Supp. 546 (E. D. Mo. 1950); Lawrence v.
Hancock. 76 F. Supp. 1004 (S. D. W. Va. 1918); Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, 30
Cal.2d 110, 180 P.2d 321 (1947); Everett v. Harron, 380 Pa. 123, 110 A.2d 383
(1955).
10. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2901.36 (Baldwin 1953).
11. 165 Ohio St. 150, 158, 134 N.E.2d 371, 377 (dissent).
12. Ohio Gen. Code § 12942 (1910).
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equitable jurisdiction should not be determined solely on the basis of a rule
of construction but rather on the merits of the case in the light of judicial
precedent.13
JOHN MICHAEL NILLES.
REAL PROPERTY - JOINT TENANCY - RIGHT OF SURVIVOR WHO FELONIOUSLY
KILLS COTENANT. - The heirs of deceased joint tenant brought an action to
impose a constructive trust on one-half of the property held by defendant as
surviving joint tenant where the defendant while insane killed his co-tenant.
It was held that insanity of the killer constitutes an exception to the general
rule in Minnesota which imposes a constructive trust on property so obtained,
and where insanity is established, the general principals of survivorship apply.'
No constructive trust will be imposed, the insane killer taking the fee simple
free of all trusts as the surviving joint tenant. Anderson "v. Grasberg, 78
N.W.2d 450 (Minn. 1956).
The problem of the killer benefiting from his own wrong has been before
the courts in relation to reversions, 2 remainders, 3 individual life insurance, 4
insurance on joint lives,5 community property,6 dower7 and succession,8 as
well as joint tenancy and tenancy by the entireties.0 In dealing with this situa-
tion, four theories have been advanced: certain courts apply only the equitable
doctrine which prohibits a wrongdoer from profiting by his wrongful act, and
thereby divest the killer of all jointly held property; 10 some courts completely
ignore the equities and apply survivorship concepts to allow the slayer to take
the fee to the jointly held property;-1 other courts applying the third and
fourth theories seem to give equal weight to the equities and survivorship
13. Note, 37 Iowa L. Rev. 268 (1952).
1. For allowing the defense of insanity, the court is supported by Eisenhardt v. Seigal,
343 Mo. 22, 119 S.W.2d 810 (1938).
2. Eisenhardt v. Seigal, supra note 1 (Victim held property on condition that it should
revert if the victim predecease the murderer).
3. Wall v. Pfanschmidt, 265 111. 180, 106 N.E. 785 (1914); In re Emerson's Estate,
191 Iowa 900, 183 N.W. 327 (1921); Blanks v. Jiggetts, 192 Va. 337, 64 S.E.2d 809
(1951).
4. New York Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U. S. 591 (1886). See also
Vance, Insurance J 117 (3d ed. 1951); Grossman, Liability and Rights of the Insurer
When the Death of the Insured Is Caused by the Beneficiary or an Assigns, 10 B. U. L.
Rev. 281 (1930).
5. Spicer v. New York Life Ins. Co., 268 Fed. 500 (5th Cir. 1920) cert. denied,
255 U. S. 572 (1921); Merrity v. Prudential Ins. Co., 110 N. J. L. 414, 166 At. 335
(1933).
6. Hill v. Noland, 149 S.W. 288 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912).
7. Barnes v. Cooper, 204 Ark. 118, 161 S.W.2d 8 (1942); Owens v. Owens, 100
N. C. 240, 6 S.E. 794 (1888).
8. Atkinson, Wills 6 37 (2d ed. 1953); Restatement, Restitution 1 187 (1937);
Note, 29 Mich. L. Rev. 745, 746 (1931). Several states including North Dakota have a
statute prohibiting the murderer from taking under a will of his victim. N. D. Rev. Code
J 56-0423 (1943).
9. Although joint tenancy and tenancy by the entireties differ in certain respects, such
as the methods by which they can be terminated, the courts generally treat the two types
of estate in the same manner in relation to the present problem. In re Santourian's Estate,
125 Misc. 668., 212 N. Y. Supp. 116 (Surr. Ct. 1925) (joint tenancy in a bank account);
Van Alystyne v. Tuffy, 103 Misc. 455, 169 N. Y. Supp. 173 (Sup. Ct. 1918) (Tenancy by
the entireties).
10. In re Santourian's Estate, supra note 9 ("[II am opposed to . .. any doctrine of
law which offers a premium to husbands to kill their wives.")
11. Smith v. Greenberg. 121 Colo. 417, 218 P.2d 514 (1950).
